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Can I choose to be who I am not? On (African) Subjectivity  
 




This article engages Abraham Olivier’s recent distinction between ‘being’ and 
‘choosing to be’ within his phenomenological approach to subjectivity in general and 
to African, communal subjectivity in particular. I recapitulate and problematize 
aspects of Olivier’s reverse phenomenological analysis, briefly contrasting it with more 
orthodox African approaches to the ontology of the self. I then hone in on the 
distinction between being who I am and choosing to be who I am not. I argue that I 
can indeed choose to be who I am not, subject to the proviso that I cannot choose to 
be who I am. I close with some reflections on the moral significance of conscientiously 
choosing to be who I am not.  
 
Keywords: African communalism, subjectivity, reverse phenomenology, being who one is 
not.   
 
I.  Introduction 
In ‘On Being an African’, Abraham Olivier offers the following conclusions to his analysis of 
African subjectivity or ‘selfhood’: 
 
‘(t)here is something that it is like to be an African. Africans are different like Chinese, 
Americans, Germans and Arabians are different. I can go to Africa and live with as well as 
adopt the style of a local African community. But my tongue will forever betray me and if 
not, if I think I am completely African, the community will ever so subtly convey to me the 
contrary. They might not exclude me, but they will never completely include me – I have not 
been in their forest. Of course, I cannot, as it were, be an African ‘human’, but I can choose 
to see ‘myself’ as an African. I am indeed free to choose to live as an African. This freedom 
of self-ascription sets me free to go through any forest and become any person I want to be. 
There is something that it is like to be an African and that I cannot be. But there is 
something that it is like to choose to be an African. That I can be.’1 
                                                     
1 Abraham Olivier, ‘On Being and African’, Quest: An African Journal of Philosophy 25, Nos 1-2, 77-102, at 102. 
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What sense can be made of the difference between ‘being an x’ and ‘choosing to be an x’? 
More specifically, what sense can be made of the claim that, while I cannot be who I am not 
I can nonetheless choose to be who I am not? Prima facie, I find Olivier’s claim highly 
intuitive that I cannot be who I am not. Considered merely formally, the claim is 
tautological: an x self-evidently cannot (simultaneously) be a –x.  Yet the experience, in a 
given situation, of failing to be who it would be apposite to be in that situation is real 
enough for many people. Immigrants are perhaps the most obvious example: they are often 
acutely aware of the fact that their tongue forever betrays them – however much they try, 
they cannot be who they are not. On the other hand, and perhaps by the same token, are 
immigrants not precisely who they are not? Immigrants do in many respects live lives that 
are at one remove from their consciousness of who they in fact are. Moreover, did many of 
them not choose to be who they are not when they decided to live in environments in which 
their tongue forever betrays them? Are immigrants not who they are – are they who they 
are not? What sort of subjectivity do immigrants have? And if immigrants can be both who 
they are and who they are not, can’t anyone, at least in principle?  In which case, what sort 
of subjectivity does anyone have?2 
 
Olivier’s is a general claim about subjectivity: Africans are no more different from Germans 
than Germans are different from the Chinese. Moreover, Olivier’s concern is neither 
psychological nor sociological; he takes the question as to whether there is anything that it 
is like to be an African to ‘pierce into the heart of the [philosophical] problem of subjective 
consciousness’.3 He gets to that heart by working back from Dismas Masolo’s communal 
conception of normative personhood to what Olivier takes to be its underlying suppositions 
                                                     
2 It may be a moot point whether one can or cannot distinguish between being a self and subjectivity or 
consciousness of self. Those who think there is a meaningful difference are likely to take the view that who 
immigrants are and who they take themselves to be are two different issues – the one may be an ontological 
issue and the other a psychological one. I here assume that Olivier’s phenomenological approach supersedes 
the distinction between objective selfhood and subjective consciousness of self: the self is subjectivity. From 
this perspective, the question of who one is and that of who one chooses to be lie on the same level of 
analysis: they both concern subjectivity or consciousness of self. It is this that makes Olivier’s claim both 
striking and hard to get a handle on.        
3 Olivier, ‘On Being and African’, 79. 
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about subjectivity or selfhood.4 The thought is that to the extent to which African 
philosophical accounts of normative personhood are distinctly communal they must find 
support in a philosophical account of subjectivity that is consonant with communal 
normativity. Olivier proceeds phenomenologically – one’s ‘self’ is one’s consciousness of 
oneself as a cognitively perceiving subject. However, Olivier’s phenomenology is distinctive 
in that he inverses the direction of influence from self to world. Whilst for Husserlian 
phenomenology subjective intentionality shapes the world of one’s cognitive perceptions, 
on Olivier’s account the world’s intentional effects on the subject shape her consciousness 
of self. In adopting this inverse phenomenology, Olivier takes himself to be filling a gap in 
the literature: while accounts of normative personhood are legion in contemporary African 
philosophy, questions about subjectivity have so far been neglected. Olivier’s claim in this 
regard strikes me as largely correct: there are ontologies of the self in modern African 
philosophy; these typically are both distinct from and consonant with communally 
conceived normative personhood. However, modern African ontologies of the self are 
methodologically orthodox in that they tend to treat the self as a type of entity with 
distinctive and determinate properties. The issue of subjectivity – i.e., of consciousness of 
oneself as a self – is not generally explored in these methodologically more orthodox 
accounts.5 
 
In what follows, my focus will be on Olivier’s inverse phenomenological analysis of 
contextually situated subjectivity, though I will also say something about African ontologies 
of the self. I take Olivier’s analysis to pursue two objectives at once: on the one hand, he 
wants to shore up the communalism of normative personhood by grounding it in an 
appropriate phenomenological subjectivity. On the other hand, he seeks thereby to 
generalize some of the claims of African normativity. Insofar as the claims of 
phenomenological subjectivity are general ones, and in so far as they can be shown to 
support African communal normativity, the more particular thesis concerning communal 
normativity is a legitimate philosophical extrapolation of the more general thesis concerning 
the phenomenology of consciousness or subjectivity. All this strikes me as perfectly 
                                                     
4 Dismas Masolo, Self and Community in a Changing World. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University 
Press 2010 
5 But see Frantz Fanon, Black Skins, White Masks. London: Pluto Press 1986. 
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plausible. There is nonetheless something about Olivier’s distinction between ‘being an x’ 
and ‘choosing to be an x’ that seems to me to go beyond the aim of shoring up communal 
normativity by way of the phenomenology of consciousness. Indeed, Olivier’s claim that I 
can choose to be who I am not seems to me to run counter to, rather than to support, his 
account inverse phenomenological subjectivity. And yet, while I do find it highly intuitive 
that I cannot be who I am not, there is also something oddly compelling, at least on 
reflection, about Olivier’s claim that I can nonetheless choose to be who I am not. In what 
follows I shall try to work through Olivier’s dual claim. First, I shall seek to address a 
methodological puzzle: at what point within Olivier’s inverse phenomenology can we 
legitimately shift from being who the world turns us into to choosing to be who we are not?  
Second, there are more substantive puzzles. If there can be both other-ascribed subjectivity 
and self-ascribed subjectivity, what is the relationship between them? Which subjectivity, if 
either, is more basic: the other-ascribed one or the self-ascribed one? Do persons who 
choose to be who they are not live at one remove from themselves, or does their other-
ascribed subjectivity recede into the background of subjective consciousness, leaving them 
primarily with their self-ascribed subjectivity?6  I begin with a summary of Olivier’s account 
of inverse phenomenology (section II). There then follows an interlude, in which I discuss 
more orthodox ontological accounts of African selfhood (section III), before turning to the 
issue of the consistency of choice or self-ascription with the assumption of inverse 
phenomenology (section IV). Finally, I ask in what ways it may be worth choosing to be who 
one is not, and how doing so may affect our understanding of who we are (section V).                   
 
II. Inverse Phenomenology 
Olivier’s inverse phenomenology proceeds via Paulin Hountondji’s appeal to Husserl’s 
phenomenological method in addressing the question as to a possible future African 
philosophy.7 That question arises for Hountondji from his critique of Temples’ 
                                                     
6 While the relationship between other-ascription and self-ascription remains underdeveloped in the article 
under discussion, Olivier has returned to it in some of his subsequent writings – most notably, in Abraham 
Olivier, ‘The Freedom of Facticity’, Religions 2018. There he offers a more fully developed account of other-
ascription as the basis of self-ascription. See also, Olivier, ‘Wings of Desire. Reflections on Sexual Desire, 
Identity, and Freedom’, South African Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming).  
7 Paulin Hountondji, African Philosophy: Myth and Reality. Second Edition. Bloomington and Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press 1996; Paulin Hountondji, The Struggle for Meaning. Reflections on Philosophy, Culture 
and Democracy in Africa. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2002. 
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ethnophilosophy – more specifically, from Temples’ depiction of the ‘Bantu worldview’ as a 
timelessly given, collectively perpetuated, a-rationally held set of beliefs. Hountondji’s 
rejection of Temples’ depiction as but a reflection of European preconceptions about ‘the 
African mind’ is well known; crucial to Olivier’s purposes is Hountondji’s subsequent and 
related claim that, if there is to be a future African philosophy, it will have to develop from 
systematic reflection, by individual African thinkers, out of their actual contexts of 
experience. Hountondji’s emphasis on individual thinkers’ systematically reflecting out of 
their distinctive contexts of experience has evident phenomenological connotations. For 
Olivier, ‘if Hountondji calls for a return of the African subject, its phenomenological sense is 
a return to the particular, pre-reflective, social roots of African subjects as the starting point 
of a philosophical or scientific assessment of their subjectivity.’8   
Distinctive of the phenomenological method of reflection, though not unique to it is 
its first-personal standpoint: ‘subjectivity refers to first-person “subjective consciousness or 
experience”, as well as to “self” or “selfhood”.’9 This standpoint implies the givenness of 
some kind of ‘I’, i.e. the givenness of the self as conscious of itself and as distinct from its 
experiences even if accessible to itself only through these experiences. This, as any rate, is 
what I assume to be Husserlian phenomenology’s partly Cartesian and partly Kantian 
inheritances: while for Kant, the ‘I think’, billed as the ‘transcendental unity of 
apperception’, has to accompany all my experiences in order for them to be mine, the 
Husserlian ‘I’ represents a partial return to the Cartesian cogito. Kantian passive receptivity 
of the sensible manifold is replaced with a more immediately active, perceptually cognitive 
grasp of ‘one’s’ world – according to Husserlian phenomenology, the world is a projection of 
subjective intentionality: world-directed consciousness determines the subject’s experience 
of the world. 
Olivier proposes to take a step beyond Husserlian phenomenology towards what he 
calls inverse intentionality: ‘if we say that consciousness is defined by intentional effects, 
the direction of fit is inversed and it is the world that primarily directs consciousness.’10 On 
this version of phenomenology, it is not the ‘I’ that projects the world of its experience; 
                                                     
8 Olivier, ‘On Being and African’, at 83. 
9 Ibid., at 81. 
10 Ibid., at 89. This actually seems to me to be a move back towards Kantian passive receptivity – though the 
phenomenological framework does of course seek to preserve the unity of perceptual experience in lieu of 
Kant’s distinction between two separate roots of human knowledge. 
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instead the effects of the world on subjective intentionality shapes the subject’s 
consciousness of self. Relative to the ‘I’, the world now plays the more active part – the 
world acts on subjective intentionality rather than the other way around. What moves 
Olivier to perform this ‘inversion’ is the dominance of communal conceptions of 
personhood in African normative theorizing. Olivier claims that, insofar as ‘subjectivity is 
socially and in this sense externally based’,11 then ‘the conception of inversed intentionality 
offers a way to explain why and how sociality can be seen as the basis of subjectivity.’ (89) 
In effect, inverse phenomenology denies the ontological primacy of ‘I’; the ‘I’ as subjective 
consciousness rather emerges from the world’s intentional effects on the subject.  
But how precisely can we deny the ontological primacy of ‘I’ in the formation of 
world experience that is nonetheless subjective, hence both conscious and reflexive? 
Olivier’s inverse intentionality is itself premised on a prior inversion of the constituents of 
phenomenological intentionality. Again, if we think of traditional phenomenology as 
eliminating Kant’s distinction between sensible intuition and rational understanding as two 
separate epistemic capacities, we arrive at something like perceptual cognition. To the 
extent that the antecedently given, Cartesian ‘I’ has a certain primacy in Husserlian 
phenomenology, the I’s perceptions of the world are cognition-directed. On Olivier’s inverse 
account, by contrast, cognition is perception-directed. One way of putting it is to say that 
although an ‘I’ remains, it is not the Cartesian ‘I’ of rationally cognitive perception, but 
rather the physically embodied ‘I’ of sensory perception.12 For Olivier, perception has an 
ineliminably sensory dimension: ‘sensations affect me by drawing my attention to positions, 
situations, and objects, thereby filling in my experiences in different ways’.13 Further, ‘every 
sensation is characteristically intentional for it directs and ties me to objects and contexts in 
particular ways.’14 Olivier does not deny subjective intentionality: ‘intentional effects’ are 
the effects on subjective consciousness that result from the world’s impingement on it. The 
world’s impingement on a rock would not produce intentional effects, as rocks lack 
subjectivity. Nonetheless, it is the impingement of the world that produces intentional 
effects in and for the physically embodied subject, not subjective intentionality that directs 
                                                     
11 Ibid., at 87. 
12 Olivier’s account here may also betray certain sympathies with elements of Negritude that emphasize the 
conative aspects of being human.   
13 Olivier, ‘On Being an African’, at 87. 
14 Ibid., at 88. 
 7 
cognitive perception of the world. In consequence, ‘the subject is the project of a world that 
the subject does not itself primordially project.’15 
If we take this general sketch of inverse intentionality and conjoin it with African 
accounts of communal personhood, the resulting picture is of consciousness of self as 
emerging from and as shaped by the surrounding communal world. Olivier says that, ‘what I 
am, I become first and foremost by virtue of societal positions, for instance, by inheriting 
the perspective of an African infant on the back of my parent.’16 More generally, ‘I 
subsequently become the subject of my experiences’ (emphasis added) — my subjectivity is 
the product of the world’s intentional effects on me. I find Olivier’s example – the infant’s 
perspective from the parent’s back – striking and powerful. Precisely for that reason, the 
example must be handled with care. That it is not an innocent example is clear from the 
distinctiveness, from a European experiential perspective, of a parental practice that is 
ubiquitous in Africa. What strikes a European as the highly distinctive perspective afforded 
the infant on her parent’s back will strike an African as the commonest perspective in the 
world. I take it that this is, in part, Olivier’s point: to be an African is among other things not 
even conscientiously to notice the perspective of an infant on her mother’s back. To the 
extent to which that perspective strikes you as anything to write home about, your tongue 
is betraying you. 
How crucial is the experience of one’s first few years on the parent’s back to one’s 
emergent subjectivity? Is this not just a European’s projection of ‘Africanity’? Would a 
European pick out the perspective from the push-chair as crucial to the development of 
European subjectivity? Or rather, if an African were so to pick it out as crucial to the 
formation of European subjectivity, would a European have reason to take this seriously? In 
short, Olivier’s example runs the risk of ‘essentialising’ what it is to be an African from a 
perspective that is external to being one. This risk does not invalidate Olivier’s example. In 
one sense, the risk attends the entire field of modern African philosophy as it finds itself 
confronted with the historically conditioned peculiarity that it must both affirm the 
distinctiveness of its possible contributions to the discipline in general whilst yet avoiding 
‘essentialising’ those contributions in Temples-like manner. As noted above, the challenge 
                                                     
15 Ibid., at 89. 
16 Ibid., at 95. 
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lies in drawing out general insights from within distinctly African experiences and 
thoughts.17 Olivier’s example of the infant on her parent’s back may well succeed in 
illustrating what the European push-chair precisely fails to be able to show, namely, that 
any infant’s pre-cognitive perceptual perspective is in fact comprehensive of the entire 
social world around her. Thus considered, the example is striking not so much because of its 
exotic appeal for those to whom it is not a reference to the mundane but rather because it 
serves to illustrate a general phenomenological point: namely, that the mundane 
perspective, whichever form it happens to take, pre-cognitively opens up an entire social 
world to those whose perspective it is.  
The fact that the particular example serves to illustrate the general point particularly 
well is a function of the practice itself: the infant accompanies her mother, on the latter’s 
back, every day throughout the day, so is routinely perceptually exposed to the entire range 
of diverse social activities and interactions from that perspective. Indeed, Olivier’s point 
may be twofold: on the one hand, the example illustrates the general claim of inverse 
intentionality – the claim that our exposure to the social world around us produces 
intentional effects in us that in turn shape our subjectivity. On the other hand, the example 
also illustrates just how much the infant implicitly learns, by way of perceptual absorption, 
about the social world of which she is a constituent member. What is more, the infant 
herself already plays a social role in her social world: she plays the role of the infant on her 
mother’s back.18 She is not an impartial observer so much as a participant learner – other 
community members interact with her on her mother’s back and she with them from that 
position. Olivier’s point is that according to inverse intentionality, the infant’s emergent 
subjectivity – her emergent consciousness of herself – is the product of the intentional 
effects on her of the sweep of sociality around her – both observant and interactive – from 
that perspective 
                                                     
17 On theorising the relation between the culturally particular and the universal, see especially Kwasi Wiredu, 
Cultural Universals and Particulars. An African Perspective. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University 
Press, 1996. 
18 On subjectivity as social role playing see also J. David Velleman, How We Get Along. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009.  See also J. David Velleman, ‘The Self as Narrator’ in his Self to Self. Selected Essays 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2006), 203-23. There are some methodological similarities between 
narrative and phenomenological accounts of subjectivity, though on the narrative account the emphasis is on 
self-construction rather than consciousness of self.   
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But now the objection may be that inverse intentionality makes a merely 
psychological point. We all now know that our early years are the most formative – 
however, psychology is not philosophy. While we may concede that the infant’s experience 
on her mother’s back is psychologically formative for her, what does this tell us about 
subjectivity in a philosophically significant sense? I do not want to get drawn into debates 
about disciplinary boundaries – I raise the point in part because it will seem like an obvious 
objection from at least some philosophical perspectives.19 I am less sure that it is an obvious 
objection from a phenomenological perspective: proponents of the latter may reasonably 
hold that psychological practice tracks (inverse) phenomenological insight -- the insight that 
human subjectivity is indeed a function of cognitively perceptual interaction with the world. 
From a phenomenological perspective, the response to the objection from psychologism 
may well be either that the disciplinary distinction is itself overdrawn or that  the 
phenomenology of subjectivity serves as bedrock to psychology as a more applied form of 
inquiry into (the pathologies of) phenomenologically formed subjectivity.20  
I shall instead end this section by raising a worry of my own – one that I will return to 
below. The worry anticipates Olivier’s subsequent point about our supposed ability to 
choose to be who we are not. The worry is that if, as Olivier puts it, ‘other-ascription 
precedes self-ascription’ such that we are, in the first instance, who our social world turns 
us into, then at what point does self-ascription overtake other-ascription such that we can 
choose to be who, phenomenologically, we are not? It is at this level that the example of the 
infant on her mother’s back may be problematic: while we may agree that the small child is 
indeed exposed to a social world which she absorbs as participant learner; we may also ask 
at what point this process of learning by absorption ceases. It will have to cease if self-
ascription is to come to the fore: yet how can self-ascription come to the fore without 
thereby undercutting the claims of inverse phenomenology? That is the methodological 
worry.  Substantively, too, Olivier’s position raises a number of questions regarding the 
relationship between other-ascribed and self-ascribed subjectivity. I am primarily exercised 
                                                     
19 The issue of ‘psychologism’ in connection with reflexive subjectivity pre-occupied analytic approaches to 
Kant’s transcendenal idealism. See, especially, P.F. Strawon, The Bounds of Sense. An Essay on Kant’s Critique 
of Pure Reason. London: Routledge Publishers 1989, esp. 162-74. 
20 I briefly return to this issue in section V. 
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by the more substantive questions. Before turning to some of them, I want to undertake a 
brief excursion into more traditional African ontologies of the self.  
 
III. Ontologies of the self 
As noted, according to Olivier, while discussions of normative personhood are ubiquitous in 
current African philosophy, relatively little has so far been said about subjectivity or 
consciousness of self. Olivier implies, moreover, that subjectivity has a certain ontological 
primacy in relation to the normativity of personhood: his account of how the self conceives 
of itself is meant to shore up communal normativity. And indeed, if we think of one of the 
most influential accounts of communal personhood – that by Ifeyani Menkiti21 – Olivier’s 
phenomenology of subjectivity does a good job in supplying a complementary account of 
the intended kind. Yet while it is true that subjectivity in the phenomenological sense is not 
a dominant topic, the ontology of the self as distinct from normative personhood is widely 
discussed in current African philosophy (though the term used is usually the ontology of the 
person rather than the self). Generally, moreover, a close relation is at least implicitly 
assumed to obtain between the ontology of the person and the normativity of personhood. 
Take Kwame Gyekye’s and Segun Gbadegesin’s respective analyses of traditional Akan and 
Yoruba beliefs about the ontological constitution of the person as a distinctive kind of 
being.22 Though neither adopts a phenomenological approach, both Gyekye and Gbadegesin 
can reasonably be construed as responding to Hountondji’s demand that any viable African 
philosophy must engage actual contexts of African experience. Both bring linguistic and 
conceptual analyses to bear on traditional beliefs about the person; both seek thereby to lay 
bare what the Akan and the Yoruba respectively must be taken to believe about the 
constitution of persons. My aim in this section is not to engage in detailed discussion of 
Gyekye and Gbadegesin’s respective accounts – what follows is merely a summary of some 
key areas of substantive ontological overlap. My chief interest lies in flagging these more 
                                                     
21 Ifeyani Menkiti, ‘On the Normative Conception of a Person’ in Kwasi Wiredu (ed.), Companion to African 
Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers 2006, 324-31. 
22 See, respectively, Segun Gbadegesin, African Philosophy. Traditional Yoruba Philosophy and Contemporary 
African Realities. New York: Peter Lang, 1991; especially chapters 2 and 3; Kwame Gyekye, African 
Philosophical Thought. The Akan Conceptual Scheme. Revised Edition. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 
1995, especially chapters 6 and 7. 
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orthodox ontologies of the person as potential alternatives to Olivier’s phenomenology of 
the self.  
 What are the differences between what I call orthodox ontology of the person and 
phenomenological subjectivity? The crucial difference can perhaps be put in terms of the 
distinction between an external or third-personal and an internal of first-personal 
perspective. As noted, while an orthodox ontology enquires into the kind of being a person 
is, the phenomenology of subjectivity considers a person’s experience or consciousness of 
itself as that kind of being. The external perspective does not obviously rule out the internal 
perspective: to ascertain what kind of being persons are in general is not in itself to rule out 
the importance of the albeit separate question as to what it is to be conscious to being a 
being of that kind. That said, one might take the view – and I take it that, following Kant, 
phenomenological inquiry generally does take the view that subjectivity cannot be 
approached in the same manner as objectivity: ‘the self’ (or person) is not just one kind of 
being or entity among others. Indeed, ‘the self’ may not be any kind of entity at all: we 
cannot take the objective perspective onto ourselves but can at most posit some kind of 
placeholder self as the formal depository of our experience of unitary consciousness. For 
the phenomenologist, the internal perspective does not so much supplement the external 
one as replace it. The phenomenologist does not ask, ‘what are the constituent properties 
of the type of entity called person?’, but asks, rather, ‘what is it to be conscious of oneself 
as a self?’  Thus, while for the orthodox ontologist the issue of subjectivity may be 
supplementary to the objective features of personhood, for the phenomenologist 
personhood is subjectivity all the way down. 
 In modern African philosophy, the continued prevalence of the orthodox ontological 
approach may have to do with the endeavour to overcome colonially superimposed beliefs 
about the self, especially through the influence of Christian missionary work.23 The 
distinctiveness of many African accounts of the self emerges especially clearly in the 
emphasis which both Gyekye and Gbadegesin (as well as others) place on its tripartite 
structure in traditional Akan and Yoruba thought. Whereas Western ontologies traditionally 
follow Plato in distinguishing between the material body and the immaterial soul, the Akan 
                                                     
23 Cf. Okot p’Bitek, A Short History of African Religions in Western Scholarship. Revised Edition. New York: 
Diasporic Africa Press, 2011. 
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account conceives a person as a composite of okra (divine breath), sunsum (personal 
spiritedness or character), and honam (body). The Yoruba account similarly distinguishes 
between emi (divine breath), ori (spirit, character, bearer of destiny), and ara (body). The 
precise nature of the constitution of Akan sunsum and Yoruba ori respectively, and that of 
the relation between sunsum and okra on the one hand and between emi and ori on the 
other are a matter of considerable dispute. What is nonetheless clear, especially in 
contradistinction to the Christian division between immaterial soul and material body, is the 
inadequacy of that binary distinction when superimposed upon Akan and Yoruba accounts: 
both the Akan sunsum and the Yoruba ori are thought by many African thinkers to lie 
somewhere along a sliding spectrum between material and immaterial extremes.24 Again, 
okra and emi appear to be non-individuated constituents of personhood; indeed, both may 
be constituent features of all organic life, binding all forms of organic life together at some 
level of their respective beings. Finally, at least some Akan writers associate sunsum and 
honam respectively with lineage when they claim that sunsum is passed on by the father, 
and mogya – an element of honam – by the mother.25 
 As noted, one may wonder why modern African thinkers appear to cleave to 
orthodox ontologies of the self in the face of powerful philosophical objections to the 
treatment of the person as any kind of entity at all. Even conceding the historical need for 
and cultural value of retrieving traditional African ontologies from Christian modifications of 
them, one may object that this should be the work of anthropologists more than 
philosophers: does not the carving out of a distinctly African ontology of the person 
undermine the search for universal criteria of personhood? Here is yet another disciplinary 
boundary dispute I do not wish to get drawn into. Suffice it to say that, from the perspective 
of African philosophy, the prevalence of underlying Christian beliefs in Western 
philosophical thinking is presumably no less pregnant with unacknowledged anthropology – 
part of the point of the juxtaposition is presumably to draw attention to the latter’s lack of 
universal warrant.  
                                                     
24 On the status of sunsum, contrast Kwasi Wiredu, ‘The Akan Concept of Mind’, Ibadan Journal of Humanistic 
Studies 1983 and Kwame Gyekye, African Philosophical Thought (op. cit.), 85-90.  
25 Gyekye denies the particular association of sunsum with paternal lineage; he instead identifies ‘ntoro’ with 
paternal lineage, and mogya with maternal lineage.  Contrast Anthony Kwame Appiah, ‘Akan and Euro-
American Concepts of the Person’ in Lee Brown (ed.), African Philosophy. New and Traditional Perspectives 
(Oxford; Oxford University Press 2004), 21-34. 
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 Either way, my interest here lies in asking whether these more orthodox ontologies 
of the person do not provide philosophical underpinnings to communal normativity much in 
the way Olivier’s phenomenological approach aspires to do. To the extent that they do, do 
we need phenomenological subjectivity at all or do orthodox ontologies already take care of 
Olivier’s concern to provide philosophical grounds for communal normativity? Prima facie 
one surely must assume there to be an internal connection between ontologies of the 
person and accounts of normativity: the terminological distinction between person, self, 
and subjectivity is largely technical; it reflects a division of intellectual labour concerning a 
subject matter that is in fact a philosophically complex unity. Indeed, in relation to 
personhood the internal connection between ontology and normativity may be especially 
strong in traditional accounts. There, the division of intellectual labour may be less marked 
than it is in current academic philosophical contexts. Moreover, the oral transmission of 
ontological accounts of the person – often, as in pre-Platonic Greek philosophy, in the form 
of allegories and foundational myths – can itself be presumed to have normative as well as 
epistemological purpose. 
 One might object, ‘yes, but abstracting from all that – abstracting from tradition, 
orality, moral pedagogy – are African ontologies of the person inherently communal?’ It is 
not clear to me that one necessarily can abstract ‘from all that’ – traditional African orality 
and phenomenology may well be on a par in the thought that once one has performed 
those abstractions there may be nothing left to discuss about the person or the self. Still, 
Gyekye and Gbadegesin do approach traditional Akan and Yoruba accounts ontologically – 
they do treat the person as a kind of entity with determinate constituent components or 
properties. On both accounts those properties do include communally oriented features. 
The mentioned if contested association of sunsum and honam with paternal and maternal 
lineage respectively is one such feature; another is the binding force of okra and emi 
respectively, which links all organic life spiritually (i.e., non-physically). Relatedly, both 
Gyekye and Gbadegesin include in their respective ontologies beliefs about personal 
destiny. In Gbadegesin’s account, for example, ori is the (semi-physical) bearer of personal 
destiny and personal destinies are conceived as interconnected: any one person’s destiny is 
a function in part of the destinies of those whom he or she interacts with. The criteria for 
judging a given destiny good or bad centrally include its bearer’s communal membership 
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and service to the community.26 These and other features of orthodox ontological 
approaches to the person thus do seem to imply communal normativity. From the reverse 
order of analysis, too, i.e., moving from normativity to ontology, ontological commitments 
inform normative ones. Recall Menkiti’s contention that, under his maximal conception, 
ancestorship constitutes the highest possible form of normative personality. Belief in 
ancestral existence is clearly predicated on relevant ontological commitments – here, too, 
we have something of a ‘natural’ linkage between ontology and normativity. While Olivier 
may be correct to say that in contemporary African philosophy questions about subjectivity 
– consciousness of self as a self – so far remain relatively neglected, it is not the case, it 
seems to me, that existing orthodox ontologies of personhood in the literature cannot shore 
up communal normativity. In this latter respect, Olivier’s approach does perhaps not so 
much fill a gap as provide one further alternative approach.  
 
IV. Subjectivity, Other-Ascription, and the Limits of Self-Ascription 
The point of the above ontological interlude was to qualify Olivier’s contention regarding 
African philosophers’ neglect of possible philosophical grounds of communal normativity: 
while questions about subjectivity do remain relatively neglected, systematic linkages 
between the ontology of persons and communal normativity do exist. Moreover, nothing 
speaks against extending inquiry from the ontological constitution of persons to 
consciousness of oneself as such a being. Granted, from a phenomenological perspective 
the treatment of the person as a type of entity will seem misconceived. That is, however, a 
separate issue concerning divergent philosophical methodologies: proponents of orthodox 
ontology may find the phenomenological approach no less problematic in certain other 
respects. Thus, for example, on the orthodox approach the difference between other-
ascription and self-ascription will more likely belong to the realm of psychological or 
sociological inquiry. On the ontological account, there won’t be two ways of being conscious 
of oneself as a person -- there will only be the correct way that tracks determinate features 
of personhood. 
                                                     
26 Segun Gbadegesin, ‘Toward a Theory of Destiny’ in Wiredu (ed.), A Companion to African Philosophy. 
Oxford: Blackwell Publisher 2006, 313-23; also Segun Gbadegesin, ‘An Outline of a Theory of Destiny’, in Lee 
Brown (ed.), African Philosophy. New and Traditional Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2004, 51-
68. 
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 In returning now to the phenomenological approach, we saw that Olivier’s 
distinction between classic Husserlian phenomenology and inverse phenomenology 
depends on the distinction between other- and self-ascription. I assume that, strictly 
speaking, classical phenomenology would not invoke even the notion of self-ascription. Self-
ascription is a matter of choosing one’s personal identity or self-conception – it is in this 
sense that self-ascription contrasts, for Olivier, with other-ascription. Husserlian 
phenomenology, by contrast, predicates world-making capacities of an ‘I’ whose formal 
givenness as a conscious intentionality is presupposed. Strictly speaking, therefore, only 
inverse phenomenology operates with the distinction between other-ascription and self-
ascription. We saw that other-ascription is a direct consequence of inverse intentionality: 
the social world shapes the self I become through that world’s intentional effects on me. Yet 
to the extent to which I have the capacity for subjectivity or consciousness of self I must at 
some point become conscious of myself as someone with a socially ascribed self-identity. If 
it wants to accommodate subjectivity – consciousness of self as a self – inverse 
phenomenology must accommodate the idea of reflexive consciousness; it must 
accommodate the idea of the self’s reflexive endorsement of its other-ascribed identity. If 
subjectivity is the issue, then I cannot merely be a communal self but I must also be 
conscious of and must endorse myself as a communal self.  
Prima facie, it is hard to see how inverse phenomenology can accommodate 
reflexive self-consciousness. The difficulty might be illustrated with reference to John 
Mbiti’s well-known aphorism that, ‘I am because we are, and because we are, therefore I 
am’. For Mbiti as for Olivier, other-ascription precedes self-endorsement. Against this, 
Gyekye has objected that communally ascribed personhood presupposes individual 
selfhood: while others may turn me into the social being I become, there nonetheless must 
be a self in the first place that is capable of becoming a social being. For Gyekye, communal 
personhood depends on an ontology of individuated selves.27 
 One may retort that Gyekye’s point against Mbiti (and Menkiti) need not worry 
Olivier. Inverse phenomenology does not deny that there must be some sort of subjectivity 
                                                     
27 Cf. Kwame Gyekye, ‘Person and Community in African Thought’ in P.H. Coetzee and A.P.J. Roux (eds.), The 
African Philosophy Reader. Second Edition (New York: Routledge Publishers 2002, 297-313. To be fair to Mbiti, 
Gyekye tends simply to assume that this must be the case – he does not show how consciousness of itself is 
itself possible. 
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that is intentionally affected by the world: the very notion of ‘intentional affect’ 
presupposes some conception of subjectivity. Inverse phenomenology merely claims that in 
the relation between self and world, world has a certain primacy in the formation of 
subjective consciousness of self. Of course, the existential status of the sort of subjectivity 
presupposed differs from Gyekye’s ontologically orthodox account. While for Gyekye, an 
ontologically individuated self constitutes a particular kind of entity, Olivier’s reverse 
phenomenology relies on something closer to Kant’s distinction between empirical selfhood 
and formal or ‘transcendental’ consciousness of self. Transcendental consciousness 
becomes conscious of its socially constituted empirical self through the world’s intentional 
effects upon it. In one sense, this Kantian distinction between empirical and transcendental 
aspects of subjectivity renders it less mysterious how other-ascription can give rise to 
consciousness of self in the first place: one’s transcendental self becomes conscious of 
others’ ascription of one’s empirical self. But isn’t this Kantian distinction an even worse 
worry for Olivier than is Gyekye’s more orthodox ontological point?  
If we say that other-ascription presupposes the thought of a formal or 
transcendental consciousness of self, are we not then saying that the latter has a logical 
primacy over the former after all? Other-ascription shapes empirical selfhood, yet 
something like Kant’s transcendental self is itself a necessary condition of possible  
consciousness of other-ascription. If that is the case – if transcendental consciousness of self 
is a necessary condition of empirical selfhood – then my having the reflexive thought of my 
empirical self as me (or as my ‘self’) affords me a certain reflexive distance between my 
empirical self and my transcendental capacity for consciousness of that self. I suspect that 
this result may amount to more than Olivier had bargained for. If I understand Olivier 
correctly, he is after a kind of other-ascribed subjectivity that is in certain fundamental 
respects both irrefutable and non-rejectable – other-ascription all the way down, as it were. 
Olivier’s thought is, after all, that although I can choose to be who I am not, I cannot choose 
to be who I am. In that sense, my choosing to be who I am not is at the same time always an 
affirmation of the ineliminable primacy of other-ascription.  From this perspective, the 
Kantian distinction between empirical self and transcendental subjectivity threatens to turn 
other-ascription into a merely contingent determinant of empirical selfhood: the grounds of 
subjectivity are not other-ascription but, more fundamentally, the transcendental capacity 
for consciousness of empirical selfhood. Although we become aware of that capacity only 
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through the experience of empirical selfhood, the latter could in principle arise 
throuexperiences other than other-ascription. Since Olivier regards other-ascription as 
constitutive of one’s subjectivity he must repudiate the Kantian distinction between 
empirical selfhood and reflexive, transcendental subjectivity.28  
But can he repudiate it? The difficulty for Olivier is that insofar as he is committed to 
subjectivity understood in terms of one’s consciousness of oneself as a self, then he must be 
committed to some form of reflexivity. Kant’s notion of the transcendental ‘I’ or ‘unity of 
apperception’ that becomes conscious of itself as a self through the unity of its experiences 
may serve Olivier well here. But it is then hard to see how Olivier can avoid some version of 
the Kantian distinction between empirical self and the transcendental capacity for empirical 
selfhood. Yet to commit to that distinction would seem to undermine the constitutive status 
of other-ascription; it would have to accord the transcendental capacity for empirical 
selfhood constitutive priority over other-ascription. It seems to me that, on Olivier’s inverse 
phenomenology, we can either have constitutive other-ascription without reflexive 
subjectivity – but then cannot in fact have consciousness of self as a self. Alternatively, we 
can have reflexive subjectivity without constitutive other-ascription – but then other-
ascription is merely one among many possible alternative sources of empirical selfhood. It is 
                                                     
28 In personal conversation, Olivier has suggested to me that he may be able to accommodate this Kantian 
challenge regarding the logical priority of the capacity for reflexive consciousness of self – subjectivity – over 
other-ascription. Briefly, Olivier suggest that ‘transcendental subjectivity is as such conditioned by other-
ascription: others, with whom I interact, shape my transcendental capacity to reflect and to conceive of 
myself, and to be free to do so, before I can take the freedom to choose what I am not.’ The claim appears to 
be that I learn or acquire the capacity for reflexivity itself through the process of socialization. At least from a 
Kantian perspective, my problem with this proposal is that it seems to turn a formal or presuppositional 
requirement of empirical selfhood into something that is itself empirically acquired. But this may then open up 
an infinite regress: if I socially acquire my capacity for reflexivity, in virtue of what do I have that capacity? In 
other words, must we not now posit a capacity communally to acquire reflexivity? I think my point is this: if it 
is subjectivity we are after – i.e. consciousness of oneself as a socially constituted self, say – must we not then 
predicate some notion or capacity for selfhood that is distinct from that of which it is conscious as being? I 
cannot really see a way around this – though I also concede that, at this point, the Kantian in me and the 
phenomenologist in Olivier may simply have arrived at an ontological crossroads, as it were.           
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hard to see how we can have both reflexive consciousness and constitutive other-ascription. 
And yet Olivier needs both. 
What if we say this: it is precisely at the point of choosing to be who we are not that 
we become reflexively aware of the constitutive nature, for our empirical self, of other-
ascription? In choosing to be who we are not we come up against the ineliminable 
remainder of other-ascription – we cannot choose to be who we are. From this vantage 
point, whilst consciousness of other-ascription does presuppose something like Kantian 
reflexive subjectivity, the distancing effect that results from reflexive consciousness of one’s 
empirical self as other-ascribed does not warrant the inference to the merely contingent 
status of other-ascription. For while the initial impression of the contingent nature of other-
ascription brings into purview alternative possible grounds of empirical subjectivity -- self-
ascription, for example – the exercise of self-ascription in fact serves to bring to the fore the 
non-contingent basis of other-ascription. While we can choose to be who we are not, we 
cannot choose to be who we are: there will always be a remainder, our tongue will forever 
betray us. We can choose to be who we are not only against the background of already 
being who in fact we are. In short, while consciousness of other-ascription presupposes 
reflexive subjectivity, self-ascription in turn affirms the primacy of other-ascription.  
 
V. Choosing to be who one is not 
My claim in the last section has been that Olivier can accommodate some version of Kantian 
reflexive subjectivity within inverse phenomenology so long as he simultaneously keeps in 
play the distinction between other-ascription and self-ascription. While other-ascription 
without reflexive subjectivity cannot yield consciousness of self as an (other-ascribed) self, 
other-ascription without possible self-ascription would render other-ascription 
constitutively contingent rather than necessary in relation to empirical selfhood. It is the 
limits of self-ascription – the fact of an unavoidable remainder – that shows other-ascription 
to be constitutive of empirical selfhood. We can choose to be who we are not precisely 
because we cannot choose to be who we are. 
 But why would we choose to be who we are not? Should we not rather simply be 
who we are? What is the point of self-ascription if, far from yielding ‘authentic’ or 
‘autonomously chosen’ selfhood, it simply shows up the limits of our choices in this regard? 
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According to the account here given, are we not precisely choosing to be ‘inauthentic’ when 
we choose to be who we are not? What is the value in that? 
 There is in fact a precursor in modern African philosophy to Olivier’s distinction 
between being and not being oneself. This is Frantz Fanon’s broadly phenomenological 
account of the colonial subject’s inner experience of himself as a self who he is not.29 
According to Fanon, the colonial subject lives in a continuous state of acute existential 
anxiety. He is aware of himself as who he is not in a dual sense of that notion: on the one 
hand, he repudiates the self who he is – he has come to share the colonizer’s negative 
associations with his ‘native’ selfhood. On the other hand, he is also aware of the fact that 
he can never be who he has chosen to be – an ‘educated native’, as it were. Even the 
educated native will always be a native – there will always be a remainder, hence always an 
awareness of the self-deluding nature of this chosen self-conception. On Fanon’s account, 
stable subjectivity – a secure sense of self – is impossible under colonial conditions: you 
cannot reflexively endorse colonial other-ascription, but nor does choosing to be who you 
are not offer you an escape from this particular kind of other-ascription: the colonial 
remainder simply brings you up against the limits of your choice. 
 Fanon’s account of colonial subjectivity is a particularly tragic account of enforced, 
not to say morally criminal, other-ascription.  As is well-known, for Fanon, the only possible 
escape from this state of existential anxiety is cathartic violence: colonially enforced 
subjectivity can be overcome only by rooting it out entirely and at the collective rather than 
merely the individual level. While Olivier does at one point mention Fanon,30 his chief 
reference points are Masolo’s and other African accounts of communal normativity; 
Olivier’s version of other-ascribed selfhood is therefore overwhelmingly benign. This is no 
criticism of Olivier – colonial other-ascription is a perverse version of an ordinarily benign 
process of socialization (which is of course also why it is so powerfully pernicious). But given 
that Olivier essentially endorses benign forms of other-ascription that issue in communal 
normativity, why does he nonetheless also invoke the possibility of self-ascription?  
 I have argued that Olivier may require self-ascription in order to underscore the 
primacy of other-ascription: however, this is a methodological point. At issue now is the 
                                                     
29 Fanon, Black Skins, White Masks (op. cit.). 
30 Olivier, ‘On Being and African’, 97. 
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value or worth of self-ascription in the light of Olivier’s normative endorsement of other-
ascription. Why, given that I cannot be an African, would I nonetheless choose to be one? 
The question arises with particular force in view of the fact that, on Olivier’s account, when I 
choose to be an African, I do not thereby become one but rather become someone whom I 
am not. Is this not to choose a state of self-alienation? Choosing to be who I am not will 
forever put me at one remove from myself: there will forever be that remainder that 
reminds me that I am not who I have chosen to be. Short of having an alien self-conception 
imposed on me, as under colonial conditions, why would I choose a life at one remove from 
myself? 
 Recall: according to Olivier, ‘(t)here is something that it is like to be an African and 
that I cannot be. But there is something that it is like to choose to be an African. That I can 
be.’31 I said that immigrants might be said to choose to be who they are not. Granted, the 
notion of ‘choice’ here is loose and imprecise: most immigrants do not exactly choose to 
relocate but find themselves driven to do so by chance and circumstance. Nonetheless, by 
and large, personally successful immigration does appear to depend to a significant extent 
on endorsing a new self-conception. The immigrant will never fully shed her primary self-
conception – she will never fully shed a sense of where she comes from. Yet she may 
endorse her new self-conception as someone who in many ways is who she is not – she may 
endorse and successfully live with a sense of being at one remove from her primary (other-
ascribed) self. Indeed, over time the immigrant may begin to wonder whether her primary 
self is her ‘true’ or ‘real’ or ‘authentic’ self: is she who she ‘really’ is, or is she not ‘really’ 
who she is not? The immigrant may begin to take the view that it does not really matter 
who she ‘really’ is. Authentic self-conceptions and autonomously formed life-plans may 
come to be seen as overrated: for most of us, life affords us neither and the fact that it does 
not may not be such a bad thing.32    
 Still, while the immigrant is in many respects a good example of someone who finds 
herself endorsing a ‘chosen’ (in a very loose sense) conception of who she is not, Olivier’s 
point seems in certain respects stronger: it is as though he were positively encouraging us to 
choose to be Africans. One way of putting it is to suggest that, at least in Olivier’s case, the 
                                                     
31 Olivier, ‘On Being and African’, op. cit., 102. 
32 On the open-endedness of human life, see especially Jonathan Lear, Happiness, Death, and the Remainder 
of Life. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000. 
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emphasize on choice is fully intended – it is not to be taken in some vague or loose sense to 
do with nefarious remarks about autonomous life plans or authentic self-conceptions. It 
may, to the contrary, have a certain political ring to it. You do not choose to be that which 
you would rather not be – that which you despise or look down upon. When Olivier suggests 
that those who are not Africans can nonetheless choose to be Africans he is portraying 
being African in a desirable light. Olivier’s choice of terminology suggests that, while it may 
be unfortunate for non-Africans than they cannot be African, they fortunately nonetheless 
can choose to become such. Being and becoming African are portrayed as intrinsically 
desirable ways in which to be. If you choose to be an African you can go through the forest 
and you can begin to learn about and imbibe the practices, beliefs, and aesthetics of that 
which makes being African distinctive from being Chinese, of German. It is true that your 
tongue will forever betray you – you will never quite be African. Nonetheless, you’ll get as 
close as you can to being African. 
 In the context of post-apartheid South Africa, the invitation to choose to be an 
African makes a lot of sense – and again, Olivier’s distinction between other-ascription and 
self-ascription is crucial here.  A degree of humility will always be in order: choosing to be is 
not being and maintaining a hold on the difference seems crucial. Still, the desirability of 
being African – and I here take Oliver to have in mind being a ‘black’ African socially and 
culturally – strikes me as a political-cum-philosophical point that is well taken. Of course, 
the point generalizes. Choosing to be an African may have particularly positive resonances 
in current South Africa, but this is not to say that the essential desirability, in terms of social, 
moral and cultural heritage, of being African does not extend beyond that particular country 
or beyond the African continent more generally. Nor is it only desirable to choose to be an 
African. Choosing to be who one is not – learning to appreciate the potentially infinite 
plurality of what it is to be a human and a self – seems to me to offer a generally attractive 
antidote to our preoccupation with the metaphysical fixity of the self and with the assumed 
moral importance of personal autonomy or authenticity. Of course, consciousness of the 
circumscribed nature of Olivier’s suggested choice is essential: both the fact that the object 
of choice is negative (i.e., choosing to be who we are not), and the fact of an ineliminable 
remainder (our tongue will forever betray us) are built into the distinction and relation 
between other- and self-ascription. In choosing to be who we are not we are not choosing 
to be who we are; rather, we are expressing the essential desirability of being something or 
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someone – African, Chinese, German or Arabian – that we are not. This form of self-
ascription seems broadly consonant with communal normativity moreover: just as for 
advocates of communal normativity the moral importance of the individual self, though 
never denied, is also never all-consuming, so on the interpretation of chosen self-ascription 
here offered, we may choose to be who we are not not in order to affirm our autonomy or 
our authenticity but rather in order to participate, however, imperfectly, in the lives of 
distant others.33  
   
 
                                                          
            
 
                                                     
33 Evidently inspired by Abraham Olivier’s ‘On Being an African’, this paper has benefitted enormously from 
discussions about (African) personhood with Martin Ajei, Caesar Atuire, and Dieter Sturma. A first draft of the 
paper was presented at a workshop on ‘Persons and Community’ held at the University of Bonn on 25 June 
2018. My thanks to participants for their helpful comments and suggestions. 
